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ABSTRACT 
 
In an increasingly mobile world, the combination of mobile computing devices, 
publicly accessible Wi-Fi hotspots, and camera phones pose a significant threat to 
alphanumeric passwords in public environments.  Graphical passwords, introduced as 
an alternative to alphanumerical passwords, help prevent successful shoulder-surfing 
attacks – covertly observing or recording a password login session, however, most 
cannot prevent intersection analysis on the data collected through shoulder-surfing.  
ColorDots is a new graphical password scheme designed to be easy to use and learn, to 
prevent successful shoulder-surfing attacks, and to hinder intersection analysis.  A 
software implementation of ColorDots is tested, and the results analyzed.  This study 
showed the ColorDots graphical password scheme does prevent shoulder-surfing, and 
hinders intersection analysis on digital recordings of multiple shoulder-surfing attacks.  
Furthermore, ColorDots may be just as convenient to use as alphanumeric passwords, 
while improving password security in public environments.
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Computer passwords control access to computer systems and digital information.  As 
computing systems have become more accessible, stronger and more complex password 
schemes have been required to prevent unauthorized access and to protect information.  
The preponderance of mobile computing devices, publicly accessible Wi-Fi hotspots, 
and camera phones (mobile phones with built-in, high-quality cameras) pose a 
significant threat to the continued use of alphanumeric passwords for the purpose of 
user authentication in public environments. 
 
Graphical password schemes are an alternative to traditional alphanumeric passwords.  
Graphical passwords offer several advantages over alphanumeric passwords; however, 
many of the proposed schemes are susceptible to shoulder-surfing.  A form of social 
engineering, shoulder-surfing occurs when an attacker observes or records a user 
entering their password to gain access to a computer system.  A number of shoulder-
surfing-resistant graphical password schemes have been proposed, but they offer little 
defense against intersection analysis.  Intersection analysis is a method used to analyze 
the changes observed between multiple login attempts to help determine a user’s 
password (Dumphy10).  A successful graphical password scheme must prevent 
successful shoulder-surfing attacks and resist intersection analysis; however, it must 
also be easy to learn and use.  A review of the literature failed to produce a single
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graphical password scheme that significantly met these requirements.  ColorDots is a 
new graphical password scheme based on the effective elements of three successful 
graphical password schemes.  The purpose of this study is to determine whether 
ColorDots satisfies each of the requirements for a successful graphical password 
scheme.  A software implementation of ColorDots allows subjects to interact with the 
graphical password scheme during multiple phases of testing, and the results analyzed.
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Chapter 2 
GRAPHICAL PASSWORDS 
 
Greg Blonder was the first to propose graphical passwords as an alternative to 
alphanumeric passwords (Blonder96).  Graphical password schemes are a solution to 
many of the human-induced vulnerabilities of alphanumeric passwords such as selecting 
simple or common words for passwords, writing passwords down, and using personal 
information within passwords.  The concept that human beings are capable of recalling 
graphical information more easily than alphanumeric information is the basis for 
graphical passwords.  Moncur et al. describes three general graphical password systems 
(Moncur07).  Drawmetric schemes, Figure 1-A, require users to redraw a predefined 
picture.  Cognometric schemes, Figure 1-B, require users to select a set of predefined 
target images from a larger set of distraction images.  Locimetric schemes, Figure 1-C, 
require users to click predefined points on a given image. 
 
A major drawback of the Drawmetric and Locimetric schemes is that user input is time-
invariant – does not change from login to login (Man03).  Although early Cognometric 
schemes also suffered from time-invariant input, later proposals took steps to overcome 
this vulnerability.  The primary disadvantage of time-invariant password schemes, 
alphanumeric or graphical, is their susceptibility to shoulder-surfing attacks – an
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attacker need only view a successful authentication attempt once to compromise a 
user’s account (Tari06). 
 
Draw-a-Secret (1999) PassFaces (2000) PassPoints (2005) 
   
A) Drawmetric B) Cognometric C) Locimetric 
Figure 1: Graphical Password Schemes 
 
2.1 Shoulder-surfing 
 
Shoulder-surfing is most likely to occur in public environments such as a coffee shop, 
café or library where users are less likely to be suspicious of others sitting or standing 
nearby (Gao09).  Attackers often use devices such as a camera phone to record the 
password entry process to reduce their risk of discovery.  This has the potential of 
allowing attackers to collect passwords over an extended period.  Such techniques have 
been successful against Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) to allow attackers to make 
fraudulent withdrawals (De Luca10).  As camera phones become more prevalent in 
society, shoulder-surfing attacks are likely to become more common and successful 
(Tari06).  For this reason, researchers have proposed several graphical password 
schemes that resist shoulder-surfing attacks. 
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2.2 Shoulder-surfing Resistant Graphical Password Schemes 
 
Graphical password schemes resistant to shoulder-surfing attacks appear in two general 
categories:  multi-factor schemes and indirect input schemes (Lashkari09).  Multi-factor 
schemes involve the use of multiple inputs or technologies such as a smart card, key 
generator dongle, voice recognition or optical scanner.  Even if an attacker acquires the 
user’s graphical password, they are unable to log into the system without the additional 
authentication factor(s).  Indirect input schemes involve surreptitious input methods to 
avoid direct identification of the password such as using a keyboard, clicking within an 
on-screen region containing the graphical password images or tracking the user’s eye 
movements.  Due to the scope of this paper, the review of graphical password schemes 
is limited to indirect input schemes involving the use of a keyboard and/or mouse. 
 
Sorbrado et al. proposed several graphical password schemes resistant to shoulder-
surfing attacks (Sobrado02).  The Intersection scheme, Figure 2, requires the user to 
locate their password images and click within the region containing the intersection 
point of the imaginary lines connecting each pair of images (the lines and circles in 
Figure 2 are for illustration purposes only and are not visible to the user).  To prevent 
guessing, users are required to complete this process multiple times using different 
image layouts to log into the system. 
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Figure 2: Intersection Scheme 
 
The Triangle scheme, proposed by Sobrado and Birget (Sobrado02), influenced the 
Convex Hull Click (CHC) scheme proposed by Wiedenbeck et al., Figure 3 
(Wiedenbeck06).  The CHC scheme requires users to locate their password images and 
then click within the convex hull region created by the images.  Like the Intersection 
scheme, users must complete this process multiple times in order to log into the system. 
 
ColorPIN, Figure 4, the indirect input scheme proposed by De Luca et al., uses a 
keyboard for password entry rather than a mouse because the scheme is intended for use 
with ATMs.  With this scheme, users locate each number in their Personal Identification 
Number (PIN) and select the appropriate letter corresponding to the number’s position 
in the PIN – black, red, white or black for positions 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
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Figure 3: Convex Hull Click (CHC) Scheme 
 
 
Figure 4: ColorPIN Scheme 
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Due to the shoulder-surfing resistant design of the reviewed graphical password 
schemes, even if an attacker records the user entering their password, the attacker is 
unable to identify the user’s password images – preventing the attacker from logging 
into the system.  However, if an attacker is able to record the user entering their 
password multiple times, the attacker is more likely to discover the user’s password by 
performing intersection analysis on the recordings. 
 
2.3 Intersection Analysis 
 
Intersection analysis is useful for identifying users’ passwords in time-variant graphical 
password schemes such as Intersection, CHC, and ColorPIN, where the input required 
to log into the system changes with each login session.  Intersection analysis is more 
effective when performed on data contained in shoulder-surfing recordings allowing for 
repeated analysis of the recorded data.  Studies have shown that intersection analysis 
performed on as few as two recordings can successfully identify a user’s password (De 
Luca10). 
 
One characteristic of graphical password schemes, which make them more susceptible 
to intersection analysis, is the ratio of the number of displayed distraction images and 
the total number of distraction images.  A particular distraction image may appear in the 
interface at a lower frequency than the target images, if this ratio is low (Dumphy10).  
By comparing the frequency at which the images appear in the interface, an attacker 
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may identify the user’s password images.  To prevent this form of intersection analysis, 
researchers suggest using the same set of images for each login session. 
 
A review of the available literature produced a number of graphical password schemes 
resistant to shoulder-surfing attacks, but all were susceptible to intersection analysis.  
Although two of these schemes claimed to be resistant to intersection analysis involving 
video recordings of a user’s password entries, the authors failed to support their claims 
by considering only two such recordings or by ignoring analysis of video recordings 
altogether (Gao09 and Shi09).
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Chapter 3 
COLORDOTS 
 
ColorDots, a new graphical password scheme, implements effective elements of the 
Intersection, Convex Hull Click (CHC), and ColorPIN graphical password schemes in 
an attempt to produce a graphical password scheme that not only resists shoulder-
surfing attack, but also hinders intersection analysis. 
 
Users must complete a registration process prior to using the ColorDots graphical 
password scheme.  During the registration process, users will enter their personal data 
such as their name and email address.  Additionally, users will create a username and 
graphical password, which involves choosing three images from the set of available 
images.  Users can authenticate using the graphical password scheme once they 
complete the registration process. 
 
The proposed graphical password interface, Figure 5, consists of the image grid, 
registration dots for each row and column, and a set of user controls.  The image grid 
contains 5x5 cells where each cell consists of a border color, a password image, and 
five uniquely colored alphanumeric characters – each selected randomly from its 
respective set.  The user controls include the Enter Password field and buttons to 
refresh the grid or request help.
 - 11 -  
To defend against shoulder-surfing attack, the interface prevents the mouse pointer from 
entering the image grid section during the authentication process.  To defend against 
intersection analysis, after each keystroke, the interface refreshes the ColorDots grid – 
the system randomly shuffles all of the colors, as well as creates a new set of 
alphanumeric characters for each cell, however, the images are unaffected. 
 
 
Figure 5: ColorDots Interface (FatCow11) 
 
To log in using the ColorDots graphical password scheme, the following procedure is 
performed (refer to Figure 6). 
1. Locate the three password images in the ColorDots grid (Figure 6-A). 
2. Visualize a triangle over the ColorDots grid that connects the three password 
images (Figure 6-B). 
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3. Visually draw horizontal, vertical and diagonal lines from the center of each of 
the three password images towards the interior of the triangle (Figure 6-B).   
4. Continue to extend the lines until one line from each password image intersects 
over one of the image cells within the triangle – the Initial Intersection Cell (C0) 
(Figure 6-C). 
5. Identify the Row Registration Dot (RRD) that has the same color as the border 
of Cn
1 (Figure 6-D). 
6. Identify the Column Registration Dot (CRD) that has the same color as the RRD 
of Cn (Figure 6-D). 
7. Locate the cell that exists at the intersection of the RRD and CRD identified in 
steps 5 and 6, respectively – the First Password Cell (Cn+1
2) (Figure 6-D).  
8. Identify the letter from Cn+1 that has the same color as the CRD of Cn, and enter 
the letter in the password field (Figure 6-E). 
9. Repeat steps 5 through 8 to locate the four remaining password cells (C2 through 
C5) starting from the last password cell identified (Cn+1). 
 
After entering all five letters in the password field, the interface automatically submits 
the password for authentication.  Clicking the Refresh button during the authentication 
process refreshes the image grid, and the authentication process restarts from the 
beginning.  Clicking the Help button during the authentication process hides the image 
grid and displays the help screen – the image grid becomes visible again only after the 
help screen is closed. 
                                                 
1 Possible values Cn are C0 through C4 
2 Possible values of Cn+1 are C1 through C5 
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   A    B    C 
  
                          D                      E 
Figure 6: The ColorDots Process (FatCow11) 
 
To prevent brute force attacks, users have a maximum of three attempts to log into the 
system.  After each failed attempt, the interface automatically refreshes the image grid 
to prevent an attacker from isolating a series of image combinations.  If a user fails to 
authenticate within three attempts, the system locks their account and sends an email 
message detailing the excessive attempts to their configured email address.  The 
message directs the user to unlock their account using an enclosed link.  After 
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unlocking their account, the system cautions the user to create a new graphical 
password images. 
 
The proposed graphical password scheme eliminates shoulder-surfing attacks involving 
a casual observer through several key features.  The user cannot move the mouse 
pointer over the image grid section preventing them from accidentally identifying their 
graphical password.  The randomly selected alphanumeric characters making up the 
password occur throughout the interface and can appear multiple times, even in the 
same cell.  The user enters the alphanumeric characters of the password in the password 
field using the keyboard, preventing simultaneous observation of the keyboard and 
interface.  Finally, refreshing the ColorDots grid after every keystroke produces too 
much information for the casual observer to process. 
 
The proposed graphical password scheme eliminates shoulder-surfing attacks involving 
a single recorded session using a recording device such as a camera phone.  Due to the 
time-variant nature of the proposed scheme, the recording of a single login session is 
insufficient to reduce the set of password image candidates to a manageable number, 
which has been determined to be seven images (a 3-in-35 or 8.57% chance of selecting 
the correct password images). 
 
The proposed graphical password scheme resists shoulder-surfing attacks involving 
multiple recorded sessions using a recording device such as a camera phone.  The 
random nature of the ColorDots grid, including refreshing the grid after every 
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keystroke, hinders the use of intersection analysis to reduce the set of password image 
candidates to a manageable number.  Although the potential exists that the analysis of 
each recorded session will reveal a unique set of distraction images, an estimated 
minimum of five such recorded sessions must exist to produce a set of seven password 
image candidates. 
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Chapter 4 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
The objective of the current study is to determine whether the ColorDots graphical 
password scheme is easy to learn, easy to use, prevents single-session shoulder-surfing 
attacks, and resists the intersection analysis of multiple recordings of shoulder-surfing 
attacks. 
 
The evaluation of the ColorDots graphical password scheme uses a factorial design 
based on repeated measurements of participant performance.  The independent variables 
are the password type (random or user-generated) and password method (alphanumeric 
or graphical).  The alphanumeric password entries serve as the control condition.  
Participants perform four authentications – one authentication for each combination of 
the independent variables.   
 
The current study occurs in three independent phases.  The first phase tests the ability of 
participants to authenticate using ColorDots.  The second phase tests the ability of 
participants to recall their graphical password one week after their initial exposure to 
the graphical password scheme.  The third phase tests the ability of participants to 
identify a ColorDots graphical password using intersection analysis techniques on 
multiple recordings of simulated shoulder-surfing attack on a victim authenticating with 
ColorDots.  Afterwards, participants complete a survey regarding the characteristics of
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the ColorDots graphical password scheme, including its ease of use and its perceived 
vulnerability to shoulder-surfing attack.  
 
4.1 Phase 1:  ColorDots Familiarization and Initial Tests 
 
After an introduction to the ColorDots graphical password scheme, participants 
complete the registration process, practice using the ColorDots password scheme, and 
perform four tests involving alphanumeric and graphical passwords.  During the 
registration process, participants enter their demographic data and create an 
alphanumeric and graphical password (the user-generated passwords), which are used 
throughout the study.  Next, participants review instructions on authenticating with the 
ColorDots password scheme and practice authenticating until they successfully log in 
three times, assuring they are sufficiently prepared to complete the initial tests.  
Throughout the practice period, participants have access to the ColorDots instructions. 
 
During initial testing, participants demonstrate their ability to authenticate using random 
and user-generated alphanumeric and graphical passwords.  For each test, participants 
have three attempts to authenticate successfully with the given password type and 
method.  If successful, the system records the password type and method, the number of 
attempts, the elapsed time of the successful attempt, and the total elapsed time, 
however, the system records only the password type and method if the participant is 
unable to authenticate within the allotted attempts. 
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4.2 Phase 2:  Recall Tests 
 
One week after completing the phase one tests, participants perform two recall tests 
involving the user-generated alphanumeric and graphical passwords.  Participants 
perform the recall tests in the same manner as the initial tests, including the recording of 
the data.  Participants whom fail to authenticate using their graphical password have an 
opportunity to review and practice the ColorDots authentication process using a random 
graphical password until they successfully log in one time.  With their remediation 
completed, participants have another opportunity to authenticate using their graphical 
password.  This second opportunity helps distinguish the participants who are unable to 
recall the ColorDots authentication process from those who are unable to recall their 
graphical password.  
 
4.3 Phase 3:  Shoulder-surfing Attack Test 
 
Upon completion of the phase one tests, participants receive a collection of 10 
screenshots of a simulated shoulder-surfing attack against a user authenticating with the 
ColorDots password scheme.  Participants perform intersection analysis techniques on 
the collection of screenshots during the one-week period between Phases 1 and 2 in an 
attempt to identify the victim’s graphical password.  Participants receive an example of 
an intersection analysis algorithm to use; however, they are free to use any process they 
choose.  Participants are free to analyze as many screenshots as necessary to reduce the 
number of candidate graphical password images to seven or less.   
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To prepare for the simulated shoulder-surfing attacks, modifications to the ColorDots 
graphical password scheme compensated for the inability of the screenshots to capture 
the level of detail possible with a recording device such as a camera phone.  Although 
the ColorDots password scheme leverages indirect input to prevent shoulder-surfing 
attacks, the screenshots display only the ColorDots interface.  Furthermore, the 
screenshots clearly display the alphanumeric password characters entered in the Enter 
Password field, which normally masks the characters.  Finally, by disabling the feature 
responsible for randomly updating the ColorDots interface after entering each 
alphanumeric password character, each screenshot represents a complete graphical 
password login session.  Ultimately, these modifications limit the overall complexity of 
the ColorDots graphical password scheme, allowing participants to focus on identifying 
the victim’s graphical password rather than analyzing the ColorDots graphical password 
scheme.   
 
To complete the test, participants select three graphical password images that, based on 
their analysis, represent the victim’s graphical password.  The system records the 
password images selected and whether the participant identified the victim’s graphical 
password.  To eliminate instances of guessing, participants who correctly identified the 
victim’s graphical password must demonstrate the intersection analysis technique used.
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Chapter 5 
DATA COLLECTION 
 
5.1 Subjects 
 
The participants for the study are volunteers from a population consisting of University 
of North Florida (UNF) students, 18 years of age or older, enrolled in at least one course 
offered through the School of Computing.  All volunteers are eligible regardless of 
gender, race or other demographic variables.  The selecting of participants is in 
accordance with the Institutional Review Board (IRB), which is responsible for 
reviewing and approving all human subject studies performed at the University of North 
Florida.  The IRB reviewed and approved the ColorDots study application as Exempt-
Category 2 (IRB# 10-111).  
 
5.2 Demographics 
 
The collected demographic data includes each participant’s age, gender, visual acuity, 
colorblindness, handedness, computer experience, and education level.  A participant’s 
age, gender or handedness may reduce his or her ability to learn and/or use the 
ColorDots graphical password scheme.  Furthermore, due to its visual components, 
participants with less than optimal eyesight or colorblindness may be unable to
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distinguish between the alphanumeric characters or perceive one or more of the colors 
present in the ColorDots interface.  Finally, a participant’s computer experience or 
education level may improve his or her ability to learn and/or use the ColorDots 
graphical password scheme. 
 
5.3 Procedure 
 
The study takes place over a two-week period.  Participants complete Phase 1 during 
the first week and Phases 2 and 3 one week later.  All volunteers may participate during 
the first week; however, only those participants who completed Phase 1 may complete 
Phases 2 and 3.  The student identification scheme used at UNF (the “N” number) 
uniquely tracks each participant throughout the study.  Upon completion of each phase, 
data collected on the participant’s performance is stored in two locations – the 
ColorDots database and a participant-specific XML data file – to prevent data loss in 
the event of a system failure. 
 
5.4 Apparatus 
 
For the purpose of the study, the ColorDots graphical password scheme is implemented 
as a Windows application, using the Microsoft® Visual Studio® 2010 development 
software with the Visual C#® programming language and the .Net 3.5 Framework®, and 
Microsoft® SQL Server® 2008.  The hardware for the study consists of 15 desktop 
computers running the Microsoft® Windows 7 ® operating system with the .Net 3.5 
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Framework®, and the database server running the Microsoft® Windows Server® 2008 
operating system.  The University of North Florida’s School of Computing provided all 
of the computer hardware for this study. 
 
The source code for the ColorDots application, the database design schema, the 
collected data, and all other documentation for this study is available on the 
accompanying compact disc.
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Chapter 6 
RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software package, provided by 
the University of North Florida, was used to analyze the data collected during this 
study. 
 
6.1 Demographics 
 
Although 59 subjects participated in the study, analysis of the collected data did not 
occur for 20 participants.  Of the participants not included in the analysis, 13 did not 
attend the second week of the study, four completed only one of the three training tests 
due to a software configuration error, and three had to evacuate the testing area due to a 
fire alarm in Building 15.  This study used only the collected data of 39 participants. 
 
Table 1 lists the collected participant demographics.  All but two of the 18 participants, 
whose corrected visual acuity was 20/20, wore their corrective lenses throughout the 
study.  All the participants used their mouse hand – the hand normally used to control 
the mouse.
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Demographic Female Male 
   
Gender (G) 7 32 
 
 Minimum Average Maximum 
    
Age (A) 18  25 64 
Computer Experience (CE) 3  11 44 
Education Level (EL) 14  16 19 
 
 <= 20/20 Corr. to 20/20 > 20/20 Not Sure 
     
Visual Acuity (VA) 14  18 3 4 
Corrective Lenses (CL) 0  18 0 0 
 
 Left Right 
   
Writing Handedness (WH) 5 34 
Mouse Handedness (MH) 1 38 
Table 1: Demographic Data 
 
6.2 Correlations 
 
Analysis performed on select demographic data and survey questions sought whether 
correlations existed between, or within, the analyzed data.  Table 2 lists the results of 
this analysis.  Each of the eight survey questions was in one of two categories.  
Questions 0, 3, 4, 5 and 7 referred to whether ColorDots was easy to learn and use.  
Questions 1, 2 and 6 referred to the perceived vulnerability of alphanumeric and 
graphical passwords to shoulder-surfing attacks.  The survey questions are included in 
Appendix B of this paper. 
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Several significant correlations existed between the analyzed data. 
 Gender and Question 6 (Q6) (sig. 0.045) 
 Age and Education Level (sig. 0.006) 
 Age and Computer Experience (sig. 0.000) 
 Question 0 (Q0) and Question 3 (Q3) (sig. 0.011) 
 Question 0 and Question 5 (Q5) (sig. 0.026) 
 Question 2 (Q2) and Question 3 (sig. 0.009) 
 Question 2 and Question 4 (Q4) (sig. 0.022) 
 Question 2 and Question 6 (sig. 0.033) 
 Question 3 and Question 4 (sig. 0.000) 
 Question 3 and Question 5 (sig. 0.019) 
 Question 4 and Question 5 (sig. 0.004) 
 Question 4 and Question 7 (Q7) (sig. 0.035) 
 
 A EL CE Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 
            
G .735 .261 .826 .704 .056 .797 .447 .470 .289 .045 .737 
A  .006 .000 .416 .494 .545 .663 .964 .739 .444 .188 
EL   .070 .368 .747 .086 .827 .472 .709 .128 .738 
CE    .172 .223 .817 .799 .753 .361 .498 .218 
Q0     .742 .377 .011 .085 .026 .856 .050 
Q1      .728 .315 .510 .720 .456 .897 
Q2       .009 .022 .582 .033 .937 
Q3        .000 .019 .585 .075 
Q4         .004 .755 .035 
Q5          .260 .112 
Q6           .395 
Table 2: Demographic and Survey Question Correlations 
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6.3 Initial Tests 
 
The initial tests measured the ability of participants to log into alphanumeric and 
graphical interfaces with random and user-generated passwords.  The subsections below 
present the results of the initial tests.  Throughout this section, the data analyzed 
represent successful attempts only. 
 
The two-way repeated measures analysis of variation (ANOVA) performed on the 
collected data sought to discover significant differences between the alphanumeric and 
graphical interfaces, the random and user-generated passwords, and the interaction 
between the interfaces and passwords.  The analyzed data defined two sections of 
results.  The first section reported password input accuracy, which represented the pass 
rate – the number of participants who successfully logged in, and the attempt and 
interface refresh counts required to enter the password successfully.  Higher pass rates, 
and lower attempt and refresh counts, equated to greater accuracy.  The second section 
reported password completion time, which represented the time required to log in 
during the successful attempt and the total time required to log in, which includes the 
successful attempt and each, if any, of the failed attempts.  Throughout the analysis, the 
differential main effect - the difference of effects of each of the independent variables 
on the dependent variables - was calculated, and a probability of less than 0.05 was used 
to determine whether the difference was statistically significant, and not simply due to 
chance. 
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6.3.1 Accuracy 
 
Table 3 lists the pass rate, the average attempt count and the average refresh count when 
logging into the graphical interface.  The alphanumeric interface with the user-
generated password had the highest pass rate (100%), and the graphical interface with 
the random password had the lowest pass rate (82.05%).  The alphanumeric interface 
with the user-generated password had the lowest attempt count (1.05), but the 
alphanumeric interface with the random password and the graphical interface with the 
user-generated password had 1.08 average attempts.  The graphical interface with the 
random password had the lowest refresh count (0.03); however, the alphanumeric 
interface did not support the refresh functionality. 
 
Interface Pass Rate (%) 
 
 
 
Average 
Attempt 
Count 
 
 
 
Average 
Refresh 
Count 
    
Alphanumeric Random 94.87 1.08 N/A  
Alphanumeric User Gen. 100.00 1.05 N/A  
Graphical Random 82.05 1.13 0.03  
Graphical User Gen. 84.62 1.08 0.23  
Table 3: Accuracy Components by Interface (Initial Tests) 
 
6.3.1.1 Pass Rate 
 
One of the most important considerations of a password scheme was whether users 
were likely to log in successfully and consistently.  Since the analyzed data only 
represented successful attempts for both interfaces, no significant difference existed 
between the interface or password aspects with respect to pass rate. 
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6.3.1.2 Attempt Count 
 
Another important consideration for a password scheme was the number of attempts 
users needed to log in successfully.  Table 4 lists the ANOVA results for the analyzed 
attempt count data. 
 
Source Value F Sig. 
    
Interface .157  3.459  .076  
Password .030  .657  .426  
Inf/Pwd .006  .137  .714  
Table 4: Analysis of Variance:  Attempt Count (Initial Tests) 
 
No significance existed for the interface or password aspects of the attempt count data. 
 
6.3.1.3 Refresh Count 
 
If a password scheme was too complex or confusing, users might need to refresh the 
interface multiple times to log in successfully.  Table 5 lists the ANOVA results for the 
analyzed refresh count data.  The alphanumeric interface did not support the refresh 
functionality. 
 
Source Value F Sig. 
    
Interface N/A  N/A  N/A  
Password .131  2.885  .103  
Inf/Pwd .131  2.885  .103  
Table 5: Analysis of Variance:  Refresh Count (Initial Tests) 
 - 29 -  
No significance existed for the interface or password aspects of the refresh count data. 
 
6.3.2 Completion Time 
 
Table 6 lists the average attempt and login times recorded for the initial tests.  The 
alphanumeric interface with the user-generated password had the lowest average 
attempt and login times (3.65 and 3.80 seconds, respectively), and the graphical 
interface with the user-generated password had the lowest average attempt and login 
times for the graphical interface (57.95 and 82.67 seconds, respectively). 
 
Interface 
                         Average 
Attempt Time 
                        (sec)  
                            Average 
Login Time 
                            (sec) 
   
Alphanumeric Random 5.99 7.01  
Alphanumeric User Gen. 3.65 3.80  
Graphical Random 69.83 92.35  
Graphical User Gen. 57.95 82.67  
Table 6: Completion Time Components by Interface (Initial Tests) 
 
Although analyzed data considers the interface and password combinations separately, 
it is important to analyze the interaction between the two variables.  The performed 
ANOVA evaluated the interactions between interfaces and password types with respect 
to the attempt and login time. 
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6.3.2.1 Attempt Time 
 
How long it took users to complete a single attempt is important in determining whether 
users will choose to use a given password scheme.  Table 7 lists the ANOVA results for 
the analyzed attempt time data. 
 
Source Value F Sig. 
    
Interface 3.013  66.287  .000  
Password .117  2.572  .123  
Inf/Pwd .089  1.953  .176  
Table 7: Analysis of Variance:  Attempt Time (Initial Tests) 
 
A significant differential main effect existed for the interface aspect (sig. 0.000), but no 
significance existed for the password or interaction aspects of the attempt time data. 
 
6.3.2.2 Login Time 
 
The total time required to log in determines whether users will likely choose to use a 
given password scheme.  Table 8 lists the ANOVA results for the analyzed. 
 
Source Value F Sig. 
    
Interface .942  20.718  .000  
Password .053  1.168  .292  
Inf/Pwd .036  .800  .381  
Table 8: Analysis of Variance:  Login Time (Initial Tests) 
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A significant differential main effect existed for the interface aspect (sig. 0.000), but no 
significance existed for the password or interaction aspects of the login time data. 
 
6.4 Recall Tests 
 
The recall tests measured participants’ ability to log into the alphanumeric and graphical 
interfaces, using the passwords created during initial testing, after one week of disuse.  
The subsections below present the results of the recall tests.  Throughout this section, 
the data analyzed represent successful logins only. 
 
The one-way repeated measures ANOVA performed on the collected data sought to 
discover significant differences between the alphanumeric and graphical interfaces.  
The analyzed data defined two sections of results.  The first section reported password 
input accuracy, which represented the pass rate, and the attempt and interface refresh 
counts required to enter the password successfully.  The second section reported 
password completion time.  Throughout the analysis, the differential main effect - the 
difference of effects of each of the independent variables on the dependent variables - 
was calculated, and a probability of less than 0.05 was used to determine whether the 
difference was statistically significant, and not simply due to chance. 
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6.4.1 Accuracy 
 
Table 9 lists the pass rate, the average attempt count and the average refresh count when 
logging into the graphical interface.  Both interfaces achieved a pass rate of 94.87%.  
The alphanumeric interface had the lowest attempt count (1.05).  The graphical 
interface with the user-generated password had the lowest refresh count (0.18); 
however, the alphanumeric interface did not support the refresh functionality. 
 
Interface Pass Rate (%) 
 
 
 
Average 
Attempt 
Count 
 
 
 
Average 
Refresh 
Count 
    
Alphanumeric User Gen. 94.87 1.05 N/A  
Graphical User Gen. 94.87 1.41 0.18  
Table 9: Accuracy Components by Interface (Recall Tests) 
 
The analyzed data did not consider the password type or the interaction between the two 
variables since the interfaces used the user-generated passwords only.  The performed 
ANOVA evaluated the differences between the two interfaces using the user-generated 
password with respect to the pass rate, and attempt and refresh counts. 
 
6.4.1.1 Pass Rate 
 
One of the most important considerations of a password scheme was whether users 
were likely to log in successfully and consistently, after a period of disuse.  Since the 
analyzed data only represented successful logins for both interfaces, no significant 
difference existed between the interface or password aspects with respect to pass rate. 
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6.4.1.2 Attempt Count 
 
Another important consideration for a password scheme was the number of attempts 
users needed to log in successfully.  Table 10 lists the ANOVA results for the analyzed 
attempt count data. 
 
Source Value F Sig. 
    
Interface .448  9.859  .005  
Table 10: Analysis of Variance:  Attempt Count (Recall Tests) 
 
A significant differential main effect existed for the interface aspect (sig. 0.005) of the 
attempt count data. 
 
6.4.1.3 Refresh Count 
 
If a password scheme was too complex, or confusing, users might need to refresh the 
interface multiple times to log in successfully.  The analyzed data did not consider the 
refresh count results since the alphanumeric interface did not support the refresh 
functionality. 
 
6.4.2 Completion Time 
 
Table 11 lists the average attempt and login times recorded for the recall tests.  The 
alphanumeric interface had the lowest average attempt and login times (5.97 and 6.59 
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seconds, respectively), and the graphical interface had an average attempt and login 
times of 98.71 and 154.12 seconds, respectively. 
 
Interface 
Attempt Time 
                         (sec)  
Login Time 
                               (sec) 
   
Alphanumeric User Gen. 5.97 6.59  
Graphical User Gen. 98.71 154.12  
Table 11: Completion Time Components by Interface (Recall Tests) 
 
The analyzed data did not consider the password type or the interaction between the two 
variables since the interfaces used the user-generated passwords only.  The performed 
ANOVA evaluated the differences between the two interfaces using the user-generated 
password with respect to the attempt and login times. 
 
6.4.2.1 Attempt Time 
 
How long it took users to complete a single login attempt is important in determining 
whether users will choose to use a given password scheme.  Table 12 lists the ANOVA 
results for the analyzed attempt time data. 
 
Source Value F Sig. 
    
Interface 3.340  73.484  .000  
Table 12: Analysis of Variance:  Attempt Time (Recall Tests) 
 
A significant differential main effect existed for the interface aspect (sig. 0.000) of the 
attempt time data. 
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6.4.2.2 Login Time 
 
The total time required to log in determines whether users will likely choose to use a 
given password scheme.  Table 13 lists the ANOVA results for the analyzed login time 
data. 
 
Source Value F Sig. 
    
Interface 1.269  27.919  .000  
Table 13: Analysis of Variance:  Login Time (Recall Tests) 
 
A significant differential main effect existed for the interface aspect (sig. 0.000) of the 
login time data. 
 
6.5 ColorDots Training and Test Results Comparison 
 
The data collected and analyzed, representing the three training sessions, and the initial 
and recall tests, determined whether the ColorDots graphical password scheme was easy 
to learn.  Table 14 lists the average values of this data.  A common pattern existed 
within the presented results.  The initial test value was lower than the three training 
values, and the recall test value, while lower than the three training values, was higher 
than the initial test value.  The only exception to this pattern occurred within the refresh 
count results where the recall test value was lower than the initial test value. 
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Source 
Average 
Attempt 
Count 
Average 
Attempt 
Time (sec) 
Average 
Login 
Time (sec) 
Average 
Refresh 
Count 
     
Training 1 2.57 284.79  632.09  4.00 
Training 2 1.83 119.62  858.47  4.44 
Training 3 1.87 86.58  1019.05  4.44 
Initial 1.26 66.82  100.867  0.39 
Recall 1.57 104.63  179.08  0.30 
Table 14: Graphical User-generated Password Results 
 
Tables 15 and 16 list the ANOVA results for the initial and recall data, respectively. 
 
Source 
Average 
Attempt 
Count 
Average 
Attempt 
Time (sec) 
Average 
Login 
Time (sec) 
Average 
Refresh 
Count 
     
Training 1 .011 .000 .000 .059 
Training 2 .039 .034 .000 .038 
Training 3 .023 .053 .000 .034 
Table 15: Graphical User-generated Password Analysis (Initial Tests) 
 
Source 
Average 
Attempt 
Count 
Average 
Attempt 
Time (sec) 
Average 
Login 
Time (sec) 
Average 
Refresh 
Count 
     
Training 1 .063 .001 .000 .067 
Training 2 .208 .442 .000 .044 
Training 3 .245 .129 .000 .041 
Table 16: Graphical User-generated Password Analysis (Recall Tests) 
 
A significant differential main effect existed for each of the comparisons between the 
trainings and the initial tests, except for the refresh count and attempt time for Training 
Sessions 1 and 3, respectively.  A significant differential main effect existed for none of 
the comparisons between the trainings and the recall tests except for Training Session 
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1’s attempt time, the login times for each of the training sessions, and the refresh counts 
for Training Sessions 2 and 3. 
 
6.6 Shoulder-surfing Test 
 
An easily compromised password scheme is useless regardless of whether it is easy to 
learn and use.  The shoulder-surfing test sought to determine whether the ColorDots 
graphical password could be compromised using intersection analysis.  Table 17 lists 
the results of the shoulder-surfing test.  Of the 39 participants, only 3 (7.70%) 
successfully identified the graphical password images used. 
 
Passed Failed Success Rate (%) 
   
3 36 7.70 
Table 17: Shoulder-surfing Test Outcome 
 
The performed one-way repeated measure ANOVA compared the collected shoulder-
surfing test to a set of all-pass values.  Table 18 lists the ANOVA results for the 
analyzed shoulder-surfing data. 
 
Source Value F Sig. 
    
STP 12.000  456.000  .000  
Table 18: Analysis of Variance:  Shoulder-surfing Test 
 
A significant differential main effect existed for the shoulder-surfing data (sig. 0.000). 
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Chapter 7 
DISCUSSION 
 
Graphical password research began in the mid 1990’s as an alternative to traditional 
alphanumeric passwords, not only to provide a mechanism for improved password 
recall, but also to prevent shoulder-surfing attacks.  Researchers continued to study new 
ways to improve graphical password security; however, while many graphical password 
schemes were resistant to shoulder-surfing attacks involving direct observation or 
single-session recordings, most remained vulnerable to intersection analysis performed 
on multiple recordings.  The current study presented a newly proposed graphical 
password scheme capable of preventing shoulder-surfing attacks, as well as resisting 
attempts to compromise a graphical password using intersection analysis.  The findings 
suggested that the proposed graphical password scheme would be easy to learn and to 
use while preventing shoulder-surfing attacks and resisting intersection analysis. 
 
7.1 Implications of Data Analysis 
 
In reference to graphical passwords, a balance must exist between security and ease-of-
use – attaining a greater level of security through a modest increase in password 
complexity.  One of the primary questions answered in this study was whether users, 
accustomed to using alphanumeric passwords, would be willing to accept the additional
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complexity inherent in a graphical password, in exchange for improved password 
security. 
 
7.1.1 Accuracy 
 
The first aspect of accuracy considered in the evaluation of the ColorDots graphical 
password scheme was whether users were as likely to log in successfully using a 
graphical password compared to an alphanumeric password, referred to as the pass rate.  
The analyzed pass rate data indicated a significant difference existed between the 
graphical and alphanumeric interfaces with respect to successful login attempts.  The 
mean percentage of successful login attempts was 90.39% for all subjects, and the mean 
percentage of successful login attempts for the alphanumeric and graphical interfaces 
using user-generated passwords was 100% and 84.62%, respectively.  These results are 
indicative of the relative experience subjects had with each interface.  For the recall 
tests, the mean percentage of successful login attempts for both interfaces using user-
generated passwords was 94.87% for all subjects.  This outcome – a decreased pass rate 
for the alphanumeric interface and an increased pass rate for the graphical interface – 
supports previous research suggesting graphical passwords are easier to remember than 
alphanumeric passwords (Sobrado02).  The results suggested users were as likely to 
recall their graphical password as their alphanumeric password; therefore, they are 
equally likely to log in successfully using either password type. 
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The second aspect of accuracy considered in the evaluation of the ColorDots graphical 
password scheme was whether users required a greater number of attempts to log in 
successfully using the graphical password compared to the alphanumeric password.  
The results indicated no significant difference existed in the number of attempts 
required to log into either interface.  The mean percentage of correctness – the number 
of subjects who logged in with a single attempt compared to all the subjects – was 
92.17%, and the mean percentage of correctness for the alphanumeric and graphical 
interfaces using user-generated passwords was 95.24% and 92.59%, respectively.  
These values are higher than, but consistent with, previous research (Wiedenbeck06).  
The recall tests indicated a significant difference existed between the alphanumeric and 
graphical interfaces with respect to attempt count.  The mean percentage of correctness 
for all subjects, as well as the graphical interface using user-generated passwords, fell to 
81.30% and 70.92%, respectively, while the alphanumeric interface using user-
generated passwords remained unaffected.  This disparity is likely due to subjects 
having more experience with alphanumeric passwords than graphical passwords. 
 
The third aspect of accuracy considered in the evaluation of the ColorDots graphical 
password scheme was whether users required a greater number of refreshes to 
successfully log into the graphical interface.  The results indicated no significant 
difference existed in the number of refreshes required to log into the graphical interface 
regardless of password familiarity.  The mean percentage of refreshes – the total 
number of interface refreshes made compared to the total number of login attempts – for 
all subjects was 13.82%, and the mean percentage of refreshes for the random and user-
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generated graphical passwords was 2.56% and 23.08%, respectively.  The number of 
subjects that performed a refresh on the random and user-generated graphical interface 
was one and four, respectfully.  The refresh count results for the recall tests, which 
involved only the user-generated graphical password, showed an improvement with a 
mean percentage of refreshes of 17.95%, and only two subjects performed a refresh.  
The results agreed with those published in previous research (De Luca10).  The results 
indicated that the complexity of the graphical interface, and not the graphical password, 
was the primary factor affecting successful logins. 
 
7.1.2 Completion Time 
 
The first aspect of completion time considered in the evaluation of the ColorDots 
graphical password scheme was whether the attempt time – the time required to 
complete a successful login attempt – was likely to increase using a graphical password 
compared to a alphanumeric password.  An analysis of the attempt times indicated a 
significant difference existed between the graphical and alphanumeric interfaces 
regarding attempt time.  The mean attempt time for the alphanumeric and graphical 
interfaces using user-generated passwords was 3.65 seconds and 57.95 seconds, 
respectively.  Due to the simplicity of alphanumeric passwords, these results were not 
surprising.  For the recall tests, the mean attempt time was 5.97 seconds for the 
alphanumeric interface and 98.71 seconds for the graphical interface using user-
generated passwords, which was an increase over initial test results of 63.56% and 
70.34%, respectively.  Again, these results were not surprising considering users had to 
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recall not only their graphical password, but how to log into the graphical interface, as 
well.  Furthermore, the relative increase in attempt time during the recall tests for the 
interfaces was consistent – the graphical interface attempt time increased 10.67% more 
than the alphanumeric interface.  This increase in the graphical interface attempt time 
compared to the alphanumeric interface is supported by previous research; furthermore, 
the results presented by Wiedenbeck, et al, were consistent with the results presented 
here (Wiedenbeck06). 
 
The second aspect of completion time considered in the evaluation of the ColorDots 
graphical password scheme was whether the login time – the total time required to 
complete the login process, including the successful attempt and each, if any, of the 
failed log in attempts – was likely to increase using graphical passwords compared to 
alphanumeric passwords.  An analysis of the login times indicated a significant 
difference existed between the graphical and alphanumeric interfaces with respect to 
login time.  The mean login time for the alphanumeric and graphical interfaces using 
user-generated passwords was 3.80 seconds and 82.67 seconds, respectively.  For the 
recall tests, the mean login time was 6.59 seconds for the alphanumeric interface and 
154.12 seconds for the graphical interface using user-generated passwords, which was 
an increase of 73.42% and 86.43%, respectively, over initial test results.  The relative 
increase in login time during the recall tests for the alphanumeric and graphical 
interfaces was less consistent than the attempt time results – the graphical interface’s 
login time increased 17.72% more than the alphanumeric interface.  Login time is 
composed of two factors – the number of attempts required to successfully login and 
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attempt time.  Although a reduction in either of these factors should result in a decrease 
in login time, a decrease in attempt count would have the greatest affect. 
 
7.1.3 Shoulder-surfing Prevention and Intersection Analysis Hindrance 
 
The primary goal of the ColorDots graphical password scheme was to prevent shoulder-
surfing attacks.  The graphical interface design incorporated components – from the 
works of De Luca, Sobrado, and Wiedenbeck – that successfully deterred or prevented 
shoulder-surfing attacks (De Luca10, Sobrado02, Wiedenbeck06).  One of the key 
features of the ColorDots graphical interface was the use of indirect input – entering 
password characters using the keyboard rather than the mouse, which was shown to 
prevent shoulder-surfing at ATMs (De Luca10).  According to shoulder-surfing test 
surveys of the subjects that successfully determined the graphical password, a single 
screenshot of the graphical login process was insufficient to compromise the graphical 
password.  Furthermore, the surveys showed subjects had to utilize intersection analysis 
on a number of screenshots before they could successfully compromise the graphical 
password.  The surveys, as well as the previous works, showed that the ColorDots 
graphical interface was successful in preventing a shoulder-surfing attack involving the 
digital recording of a single login session.  By extension, the ColorDots graphical 
interface was successful in preventing a shoulder-surfing attack involving the direct 
observation of a single login session.  Finally, the shoulder-surfing test surveys showed 
that subjects needed to utilize intersection analysis on an average of seven screenshots 
before they could successfully compromise the graphical password, which required an 
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average of 1.67 hours.  A minimum of five screenshots were needed to compromise the 
graphical password during the shoulder-surfing test, which was over twice the number 
needed to compromise the graphical PIN used in the study by De Luca, et al.  
(De Luca10).  As configured for the shoulder-surfing test, the ColorDots graphical 
interface successfully resisted intersection analysis involving the digital recordings of 
multiple login sessions. 
 
7.2 Conclusion 
 
This study has shown the ColorDots graphical password scheme was easy to learn, easy 
to use, prevented shoulder-surfing, and resisted intersection analysis on digital 
recordings of multiple login sessions.  Although the subjects participating in this study 
had limited exposure to the graphical interface, they were able to learn the graphical 
password scheme, and produced test results that rivaled those of the alphanumeric 
interface.  Furthermore, while attempt and login times for the graphical interface (57.95 
seconds and 82.67 seconds, respectively) were significantly longer than the 
alphanumeric interface (3.65 seconds and 3.80 seconds, respectively), the average 
attempt and login times for the 20 best results were 42.60 seconds and 44.49 seconds, 
respectively.  With experience, ColorDots could be just as convenient to use as 
alphanumeric passwords, and could improve password security in public environments. 
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7.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
The ColorDots graphical password scheme relies on a combination of colors and 
alphanumeric characters, which could make it difficult, if not impossible, for users with 
colorblindness or poor eyesight to use successfully.  Would improvements to the 
ColorDots graphical password scheme make it accessible to a larger group of users?  
One improvement example would involve introducing shapes to represent each of the 
unique colors in the ColorDots interface to make it more accessible to users with color 
blindness.  Another improvement example would involve temporarily increasing the 
font size of the alphanumeric characters used in the ColorDots interface to assist users 
with poor eyesight or those without access to their corrective lenses.   
 
Allowing only UNF student volunteers, who were over the age of 18 and enrolled in at 
least one course offered by the School of Computing, limited the variety of computer 
users who participated in this study.  It is important to test the ColorDots graphical 
password scheme using a larger variety of computer users.  Does research involving a 
larger variety of computer users produce results consistent with those presented in this 
study?  One research example would accept any UNF student volunteer over the age of 
18 and enrolled in at least one course offered by the university.  Another research 
example would accept any UNF student, faculty or staff volunteer over the age of 18.  A 
final research example would accept any UNF student, faculty or staff volunteer over 
the age of 18, as well as members of his or her immediate family, within a larger age 
range. 
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To reduce the time and effort required for participants to complete the shoulder-surfing 
test conducted in this study, a number of modifications were made to the ColorDots 
graphical password scheme.  Some of the modifications made include displaying the 
actual alphanumeric characters entered in the Enter Password field rather than masking 
the characters and disabling the feature responsible for randomly updating the 
ColorDots interface after each alphanumeric password character was entered.  These 
modifications were necessary to capture the entire login process in a single screenshot, 
but they limited the complexity of the ColorDots graphical password scheme during this 
study; therefore, additional research should test the ColorDots graphical password 
scheme without these modifications.  Does the complexity of the ColorDots graphical 
password scheme increase when these modifications are removed?  Is a ColorDots 
graphical password less likely to be compromised by shoulder-surfing and intersection 
analysis when these modifications are removed? 
 
7.4 Example Use of the ColorDots Graphical Interface 
 
Although the ColorDots graphical password scheme was more complex and time 
consuming than traditional alphanumeric passwords, it was capable of providing 
increased password security in public environments, where shoulder-surfing attacks 
were more likely to occur.  Positioning ColorDots as a secure alternative to 
alphanumeric passwords for users authenticating in public environments has great 
potential.  For example, a link, which launches the ColorDots interface, could be 
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positioned on an alphanumeric password interface such as login screen of an operating 
system or website, like those used for social networking, online banking and online 
shopping websites.  If a user needs to log in while visiting a public location such as a 
coffee shop or café, they could choose to use their ColorDots graphical password rather 
than their alphanumeric password.   
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APPENDIX A 
ColorDots Testing Literature and Instructions 
 
The following pages represent the literature and instructions presented to the subjects 
who completed the ColorDots research study.  The literature provides general 
information about each stage of the research study, and the instructions describe the 
steps necessary to complete each stage of the research study.
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Overview 
 
 
Welcome to ColorDots - a graphical password authentication mechanism to prevent 
shoulder-surfing attacks and resist intersection analysis. 
 
Advances in technology have resulted in an increase in the number of college students 
who use laptop computers, the number of public Wi-Fi hotspots available to college 
students - on and off campus, and the number of cell phones and other mobile devices 
that have built-in, high-resolution cameras.  In this environment, a college student 
logging into a secure account in a public location such as the Thomas G. Carpenter 
library, Starbucks or Panera Bread is more likely to have their alphanumeric password 
stolen using shoulder-surfing. 
 
Shoulder-surfing is a technique for acquiring a student's alphanumeric password in 
which the attacker observes, and memorizes, or records the victim's finger movements 
as they log into a secure computer account such as their UNF myWings, Facebook or 
bank accounts.  The attacker simply needs to analyze the observed or recorded finger 
movements to determine the password entered by the victim, allowing the attacker to 
access the victim's account, compromising their security. Consequentially, since 
computer users commonly use the same password for multiple accounts, the attacker 
may also gain access to these accounts. 
 
ColorDots is an alternative to traditional, alphanumeric passwords, designed to prevent 
shoulder-surfing attacks, protecting computer users while accessing their secure 
computer accounts while in public. 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether ColorDots is a superior alternative to 
alphanumeric passwords compared to other popular graphical password mechanisms. 
 
The ColorDots study is comprised of two sessions - today's session and a session one 
week from today. During these sessions, you will complete the following tasks: 
 
1. Enter your demographic data. 
2. Create your alphanumeric and graphical passwords. 
3. Complete the ColorDots training. 
4. Complete the initial tests using alphanumeric and graphical passwords. 
5. Receive material to help prepare you for the shoulder-surfing test. 
6. Complete the recall tests using alphanumeric and graphical passwords. 
7. Select the victim's graphical password images you derived from the shoulder-
surfing material provided in step 5. 
 
During today's session, you will complete tasks 1 through 5. 
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Creating Test Passwords 
 
You have reached the password creation stage of the study. You will create an 
alphanumeric password and a graphical password. Please take your time when creating 
your passwords because they will be used throughout the study; therefore, you will want 
to choose passwords that are easy for you to remember. 
Creating Your Alphanumeric Password 
Your alphanumeric password MUST BE EXACTLY 5 characters long; otherwise, you 
will receive an error. Enter your alphanumeric password in the "Your Text Password" 
field and click the "Set Password" button (Figure 1). Once you "set" your alphanumeric 
password, you will not be able to change it. 
  
Figure 1 
Creating Your Graphical Password 
Your graphical password MUST consist of EXACTLY 3 images, and it cannot contain 
any duplicate images; otherwise, you will receive an error. To create your graphical 
password (Figure 2), select three images from the 25 available images. Each image you 
select (i.e., Football, Smiley Face, 8-Ball) will appear in the cells located in the "Your 
Password Images" section. Once you have selected three images for your graphical 
password, click the "Set Password" button (Figure 2). If you make a mistake or want to 
change the images you have selected, clicking the "Clear Password" button will remove 
all of the selected images from the "Your Password Images" section. You can change 
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your graphical password images at any time; however, you will be unable to change 
your graphical password after you click the "Click Here to Continue" button. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
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Training 
 
 
The ColorDots environment (Figure 1) consists of the following items: 
 25 cells, in a 5x5 grid, each containing 
o A border color 
o An image 
o 5 letters, each with a unique color 
 5 Column Registration Dots (CRD) 
 5 Row Registration Dots (RRD) 
 A password field and refresh button 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                Figure 1 
 
Entering Your Password in the ColorDots Interface 
 
Step 1:  Locate your password images in the ColorDots interface (Figure 3).  For this 
example, assume you selected the password images displayed in Figure 2 for your 
graphical password (image order is not important). 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 3 
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Step 2:  Visualize a triangle over the ColorDots grid that connects the three password 
images (Figure 4).  In the next step, ignore the images NOT covered by the triangle 
(Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
Figure 5 
 
Step 3:  Visually draw horizontal, vertical and diagonal lines from each password image 
into the triangle (Figure 6).  Continue until one line from each password image 
intersects over a single image, which cannot be one of the original password images 
(Figure 7).  The cell containing this image is the Initial Intersection Cell (C0) (Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
Figure 7 
 
Figure 8 
 
  
 - 56 -  
Step 4:  Select the Row Registration Dot (RRD) that has the same color as the border of 
C0 (Figure 9).  Then, select the Column Registration Dot (CRD) that has the same color 
as the RRD of C0 (Figure 10).  Locate the cell that exists at the intersection of the 
selected RRD and CRD – this is the First Password Cell (C1) (Figure 11).  Finally, 
select the letter from C1 that has the same color as the CRD of C0, and enter this letter in 
the password field (Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 9 
 
 
Figure 10 
 
 
Figure 11 
 
Figure 12 
 
Step 5:  Repeat step 4 to locate the Second Password Cell (C2), select the appropriate 
letter from C2, and enter the letter in the password field (Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13 
 
Figure 14 
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Step 6:  Repeat step 4 to locate the Third Password Cell (C3), select the appropriate 
letter from C3, and enter the letter in the password field (Figure 14). 
 
Step 7:  Repeat step 4 to locate the Fourth Password Cell (C4), select the appropriate 
letter from C4, and enter the letter in the password field (Figure 15). 
 
Step 8:  Repeat step 4 to locate the Fifth Password Cell (C5), select the appropriate letter 
from C5, and enter the letter in the password field (Figure 16). 
 
 
Figure 15 
 
Figure 16 
 
After you enter the fifth letter in the password field, validation of the entered password 
occurs automatically. 
 
You will have access to these instructions throughout the training stage of this study to 
review.  You should become comfortable with the ColorDots login process before 
continuing on to the training stage.  If you have any questions, please contact the 
primary investigator. 
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Initial Test Phase 
 
 
You are now prepared to take the four login tests, which will determine your 
performance when using alphanumeric and graphical passwords. 
 
Alphanumeric Password Tests 
 
The first two tests involve alphanumeric passwords.  The first test requires you to log in 
using a randomly generated alphanumeric password.  The system will prompt you with 
the random alphanumeric password to use prior to commencing the test (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
When prompted for the random alphanumeric password (Figure 2), enter the password, 
and click the Submit button.  Once the test is completed, you will continue on to the 
next test. 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
The second test requires you to log in using the alphanumeric password you created 
earlier.  The system will prompt you with the alphanumeric password you created prior 
to commencing the test (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
When prompted for your alphanumeric password (Figure 4), enter the password, and 
click the Submit button.  Once the test is completed, you will continue on to the 
graphical password tests. 
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Figure 4 
 
Graphical Password Tests 
 
The last two tests involve graphical passwords.  The third test requires you to log in 
using a randomly generated graphical password.  The system will prompt you with the 
random graphical password to use prior to commencing the test (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
When prompted with the ColorDots interface, enter the password using the ColorDots 
process.  Once the test is completed, you will continue on to the last test. 
 
The fourth test requires you to log in using the graphical password you created earlier.  
The system will prompt you with the graphical password you created prior to 
commencing the test (Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
When prompted with the ColorDots interface, enter the password using the ColorDots 
process.  Once the test is completed, you will continue on to the next stage of the study. 
 
Important Notes 
 Each test will commence the moment you click the OK button on the password 
prompts (Figures 1, 3, 5, and 6); therefore, take as much time as necessary to 
commit each password to memory, but do not write the password down or make 
any notes to assist you as this may skew the test results. 
 You have three attempts to enter a password correctly.  After the third attempt, 
you will automatically continue on to the next test. 
 
If you have any questions, contact the primary investigator - the individual responsible 
for this research study - now or prior to starting a test. 
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Recall Test Phase 
 
You are about to take 2 final login tests, which will determine your ability to recall your 
alphanumeric and graphical passwords, as well as your ability to recall how to log in 
using the ColorDots process. 
 
Alphanumeric Password Recall Test 
 
During this test, you will log in using the alphanumeric password you created during the 
first session of the ColorDots study.  The system will prompt you prior to commencing 
the test (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
When prompted for your alphanumeric password (Figure 2), enter the password, and 
click the Submit button.  Once the test is completed, you will continue on to the next 
test. 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Graphical Password Recall Test 
 
During the final test, you will log in using the graphical password you created during 
the first session of the ColorDots study.  The system will prompt you prior to 
commencing the test (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
When prompted with the ColorDots interface, enter the password using the ColorDots 
process.  Once the test is completed, you will continue on to the next stage of the study. 
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Important Notes 
 
 Each test will commence the moment you click the OK button on the recall test 
prompts (Figures 1 and 3); therefore, do not click the OK button until you are 
prepared to take the test. 
 You have three attempts to enter your alphanumeric password correctly.  After 
the third attempt, you will automatically continue on to the graphical password 
recall test. 
 You have three attempts to enter your graphical password correctly.  After the 
third attempt, you will have an opportunity to practice using the ColorDots 
process.  Once you complete the ColorDots refresher, you will have three 
additional attempts to enter your graphical password correctly.  After the third 
attempt, you will automatically continue on to the next stage of the study. 
 
If you have any questions, contact the primary investigator - the individual responsible 
for this research study - now or prior to starting a test. 
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Shoulder-surfing Test Phase 
 
You have reached the final stage of this study.  You will select the three graphical 
password images you identified from the 10 screenshots provided after completing 
session 1, last week.  If necessary, you may review the shoulder-surfing material now 
by clicking on the following link:  (link to shoulder-surfing review material). 
 
Please take as much time as necessary to examine the provided material adequately and 
attempt to discover the three graphical password images used.  To maintain the 
legitimacy of the shoulder-surfing test, you are asked to keep to yourself any notes used 
while reviewing the shoulder-surfing material and not to discuss your image choices 
with other participants. 
 
Graphical Password Images Selection 
 
You MUST select EXACTLY 3 images, and you 
cannot choose duplicate images.  To enter your 
selected images (Figure 1), select three images from 
the 25 available images.  Each image you select (i.e., 
Football, Smiley Face, 8-Ball) will appear in the cells 
located in the "Your Password Images" section.  Once 
you select your three graphical password images, click 
the "Set Password" button (Figure 1).  If you make a 
mistake or want to change the images you selected, 
clicking the "Clear Password" button will remove all 
of the selected images from the "Your Password 
Images" section.  You can only enter your selected 
password images once; therefore, please verify the 
password images you selected before clicking the "Set 
Password" button. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Clicking the "Set Password" button records your selected password images.  To 
maintain the legitimacy of the shoulder-surfing test, neither the primary investigator nor 
his adviser can confirm or deny the validity of your selected password images.  After 
the study is completed, the primary investigator will reveal the correct graphical 
password images, as well as the participants who guessed correctly, in an email 
message to each participant. 
 
If you have any questions about selecting your password images, contact the primary 
investigator.
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How to Perform Intersection Analysis 
 
 
This material will help you prepare for the shoulder-surfing test during session 2. 
 
Please refer to the 10 screenshots below.  Each screen shot shows the letters used to log 
into a computer system using the ColorDots system.  Use your knowledge of the 
ColorDots login process to analyze the information available in each screenshot, and 
attempt to deduce the three password images used for the password.  The ColorDots 
instructions are available for you to review. 
 
The following steps provide one possible method to identify the user's password images 
using intersection analysis: 
 
1. Using the letters in the Enter Password field, work the process backwards to 
discover the original intersection (C0). 
2. Create a list of all the images that can have a line drawn to C0. 
3. Create a list of all the possible 3-image combinations from these images. 
4. Repeat steps 1 - 3 using two or more screenshots. 
5. Compare each list of image combinations created in step 3 for each screenshot, 
and remove any combinations that do not appear for each screenshot. 
6. Continue to reduce the number of image combinations (repeat steps 1 - 5 for 
each additional screenshot, if necessary) until you are left with 3 to 5 image 
combinations.  One of these combinations is the graphical password. 
 
Please note that it may be possible to perform this process until only one image 
combination exists.  
 
Bring your final list of image combinations to session 2. 
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APPENDIX B 
ColorDots Surveys 
 
The following pages represent the surveys provided to the subjects whom completed the 
ColorDots research study.  The surveys allow the subjects to provide information about 
their experience with ColorDots during the study, as well as their opinions about the 
ColorDots graphical password scheme.
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ColorDots Research Study Survey 
 
 
Thank you for participating in the ColorDots research study over the past two weeks.  
We would appreciate it if you would provide us with some feedback related to your 
experiences with the ColorDots graphical password tool.  For the first eight statements, 
use the following scale: 
 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree 
 
0. ColorDots is easy to use. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
1. Alphanumeric passwords are vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attack. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
2. ColorDots graphical passwords are more secure than alphanumeric passwords. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
3. I would use ColorDots as my primary login interface. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
4. I would use ColorDots rather than an alphanumeric password to login in public. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
5. The time required to log in using a ColorDots graphical password is acceptable. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
6. ColorDots graphical passwords are vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attack. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
7. The time required to log in using a ColorDots graphical password will improve 
as I become more comfortable and experienced with ColorDots. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
8. Please provide any additional comments or feedback you may have regarding 
the ColorDots graphical password scheme and your experiences during this 
research study (use the back of this sheet, if necessary). 
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ColorDots Shoulder-surfing Survey 
 
 
Congratulations!  You correctly selected my password images during the shoulder-
surfing stage of the ColorDots research study.  I would appreciate it if you would 
answer the following questions concerning your experiences while deducing the correct 
password images.  
 
0. How many screenshots were required to identify the password images? 
 
 
 
 
1. How much time (in hours) was required to identify the password images? 
 
 
 
 
2. Did you use a “brute force” methodology or did you follow a logical system 
such as the one provided with the shoulder-surfing material? 
 
 
 
 
3. Did you identify any patterns that assisted in deducing the password images? 
 
 
 
 
4. In your opinion, are there any aspects of the ColorDots graphical password 
scheme that make it vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attack? 
 
 
 
 
5. In your opinion, are there any aspects of the ColorDots graphical password 
scheme that, if changed, could make ColorDots more secure? 
 
 
 
 
6. Please provide any additional comments or feedback you may have regarding 
the ColorDots graphical password scheme that could make ColorDots more 
secure and/or less vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attack (use the back of this 
sheet, if necessary).
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APPENDIX C 
ColotDots Challenge-Response Authentication Example 
 
The following represents an example challenge-response authentication process for the 
ColorDots graphical password scheme.  The example lists the messages passed between 
the client and server, the order of communication and the values contained in each 
message.  Although the ColorDots implementation used for testing did not fully 
implement this example, the implementation included most of the concepts. 
 
 
 
 - 68 -  
Stage Stage Name Source Destination Values Passed 
0 Announcement Client Server Session, EventID, Client 
1 Acknowledgement Server Client Session, EventID, Port 
2 Request Client Server Session, EventID, Client, Username 
3 Response Server Client Session, EventID, Seed 
4 Submission Client Server Session, EventID, Password 
5 Validation Server Client Session, EventID, Result 
 
Term Definition 
Session Random, unique value representing the current login session 
EventID An integer value starting at 0, and incremented with each stage 
Client Unique value representing the client to prevent unauthorized access 
Port Server selected value used for each stage after Acknowledgement 
Username Uniquely identifies the user during the login attempt (encrypted value) 
Seed Random value that “seeds” the client and server (encrypted value) 
Password String of characters entered during the login attempt (encrypted value) 
Result Represents the pass/fail condition of the login attempt (encrypted value) 
 
Stage Procedure 
 Note:  For each stage, the Session and EventID values are validated 
0 Client transmits the Announcement message with required values 
1 Server validates Client, selects a port, transmits Acknowledgement message 
2 
Client reconnects to the server on new port, transmits Request message with encrypted 
Username value 
3 
Server validates Client and Username, selects Seed value, calculates encrypted 
password, transmits Response message with encrypted Seed value 
4 
Client displays interface using Seed value, accepts submitted password, transmits 
Submission message with encrypted Password value  
5 Server compares encrypted password value, transmits Validation message 
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